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In 1995, when psychologist Daniel Goleman published Emotional Intelli-
gence, a treatise that topped best-seller lists for more than a year and went on to 
sell 5 million copies worldwide, he introduced a popular audience to a concept 
that had been circulating in psychology circles for some time. The idea that 
people possessed an “emotional intelligence” (EI) was not original with Gole-
man. There had already been research by several psychologists, including How-
ard Gardner, Peter Salovey, and Jack Mayer, that had mapped out a position that 
intelligences were multiple and that noncognitive skills (like self-awareness, 
motivation, and empathy) played as large a role, if not a far greater role, in 
how a person’s life turned out than did that individual’s IQ.1 Not incidentally, 
psychologists and educators who championed the centrality of noncognitive 
skills were posing a direct challenge not only to experts across the political 
spectrum who believed in the value of IQ as a metric. They were—and quite 
significantly—challenging right-wing (and often explicitly racialized) theories 
that stated how traditional IQ testing represented the most accurate predictor 
of a person’s capacity for achievement in life. Thus, the ascent of a concept of 
EI in the mid-1990s proved most timely, as it imparted a powerful (implicitly 
antiracist) alternative to a view that cognitive intelligence trumped all other 
aptitudes—especially in the wake of (and fierce controversy surrounding) the 
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publication of Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s The Bell Curve: Intel-
ligence and Class Structure in 1994.
A history of EI cannot be told apart from a history of race and class in the 
United States—and this has everything to do with one further dimension of EI 
and that is the significance to it of the ideal of self-control [Figure 1]. Goleman’s 
book had placed an extraordinarily strong emphasis upon self-control as a key 
component of EI and in all the laudatory reception no one thought to interrogate 
the genealogy of that emphasis. It is only by tracing the often complex (fre-
quently obliquely coded but nonetheless palpable) relationships between debates 
about the value of self-control among psychologists, criminologists, education 
experts and policymakers since the 1930s (and the shifting beliefs about social 
change and individual personality and perfectibility in which they are embedded) 
that the inextricability of EI—and the lessons drawn from talking about it—from 
the racial and class politics of the United States becomes clear. 
Notably, the emphasis on self-control had not been shared by earlier pro-
ponents of the EI concept. Rather, as Salovey and Mayer had written in 1990, 
EI was a much broader and diffuse “set of skills” that included “the accurate 
appraisal and expression of emotion in oneself and in others, the effective regu-
lation of emotion in self and others, and the use of feelings to motivate, plan, 
and achieve in one’s life.”2 But Goleman recast EI as having almost everything 
to do with an ability to exercise self-discipline. It was a point he hammered 
in Emotional Intelligence, writing, for instance, that “a sense of self-mastery, 
of being able to withstand the emotional storms that the buffeting of Fortune 
brings rather than being ‘passion’s slave,’ has been praised as a virtue since the 
time of Plato.” He added, “There is perhaps no psychological skill more fun-
damental than resisting impulse.” He wrote elsewhere, “The bedrock of char-
acter is self-discipline; the virtuous life, as philosophers since Aristotle have 
observed, is based on self-control.” He put the good that came with achieving 
self-control in terms that were quite dramatic: “The capacity to impose a delay 
Figure 1: A “Don’t Eat the Marshmallow!” coffee mug, currently available at 
http://www.zazzle.com. Image reprinted by permission.
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on impulse is at the root of a plethora of efforts, from staying on a diet to pursu-
ing a medical degree.”3 Goleman left little doubt as to which noncognitive skill 
he most associated with EI.
What this emphasis on self-control as a crucial—if not the crucial—compo-
nent of EI has to do with the history of race and class in the United States forms 
the subject of this essay. And it leads us directly to my second central subject 
since to make the case that self-control represented a key aspect of EI, Goleman 
relied almost entirely on a (then) not-well-known series of psychological experi-
ments that had been conducted by a Stanford personality theorist named Walter 
Mischel. At various points dating back to the 1950s, Mischel had given children 
a basic choice. Did the child want the smaller notebook now or a larger notebook 
a week later? Would she accept the smaller magnifying glass immediately or 
wait for a bigger magnifying glass a week later?4 Or—as the test span shortened 
over time—would the child choose to gobble up one marshmallow right away, 
or would he be able to wait fifteen minutes for the tester to return so that he 
could enjoy two? Regardless of the rewards involved and the details adapted, the 
core of Mischel’s experimental design remained much the same.5 For instance, 
a report on the first of these gratification delay experiments (conducted in 1957) 
described how a researcher presented young children with a larger and a smaller 
piece of candy and then announced, “I would like to give each of you a piece of 
candy but I don’t have enough of these (indicating the larger, more preferred rein-
forcement) with me today. So you can either get this one (indicating the smaller, 
less preferred reinforcement) right now, today, or, if you want to, you can wait 
for this one (indicating) which I will bring back next Wednesday (one week delay 
interval).”6 Each child then had to decide what to do next.
Importantly, as the published reports growing out of Mischel’s experiments 
piled up, Mischel began to identify an ever-widening array of correlations, all 
connected to the single decision of the child to yield or not to yield to his or her 
temptations. High delayers, Mischel posited, were more socially responsible 
and less likely than poor delayers to engage in delinquent behavior.7 High de-
layers were more mature and autonomous and possessed stronger achievement 
skills than poor delayers.8 On the flip side, the inability to control impulses 
was correlated with children who lacked “a permanent father or father-figure.”9 
These were the sort of hypotheses that clearly came decades later to fascinate 
Goleman—and that Goleman supplemented with his own spin that gratification 
delay was a skill that could be acquired: “There is ample evidence that emotion-
al skills such as impulse control and accurately reading a social situation can be 
learned.” Thus, all individuals (not only preschoolers) had the “meta-ability” to 
resist immediate temptation, but not everyone—yet—had the EI required to do 
so. But they could improve themselves.10
In more recent years, the so-called marshmallow test—as read through the 
lens of Goleman’s concept of an EI that can be mastered with practice and 
training—fairly swept through the advice-giving culture of the United States. 
In fact, it would be hard to overestimate the impact and influence of the marsh-
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mallow test on general assumptions in the United States about what it takes 
to lead a happier, more fulfilling and productive existence. The self-help and 
popular psychology industry found the marshmallow test amenable to a small 
mountain of motivational agendas—from marriage and relationship manuals 
to how-to investment books. For instance, there were the instructive—if con-
tradictory—invocations of the marshmallow test, on the one hand, in a guide 
geared to helping people exercise better “self-control in an age of excess” and, 
on the other hand, in a text on how to “come out ahead in hard times” (by keep-
ing your eye “on the marshmallow!”).11 There were as well countless manage-
ment and business publications that cite self-control (and often also Mischel’s 
marshmallow test) in discussions of how and why EI represents “the sine qua 
non of leadership,” as Goleman definitively observed in the Harvard Business 
Review in 1998.12 A guide on how to lead a more spiritually meaningful life 
asked, “Do we have the patience and vision to achieve what we really want 
as our end goals or do we lose sight of the prize because of the big, white 
marshmallow in front of us?”13 The marshmallow test turned up in books on 
how to make a million dollars through clever investments and how to avoid the 
pitfalls of so-called “short-termism” (because “short-termism causes us to eat 
the marshmallow”).14 By the time he published The Marshmallow Test: Mas-
tering Self-Control (2014), Mischel himself could not agree more, having fully 
adopted the framework of EI for how to present his own research. But what 
was being forgotten in all this new enthusiasm for EI and the marshmallow test 
was the fact that social psychological research into the dynamics of self-control 
had actually had a surprisingly long—and, as it happens, quite ideologically 
ambiguous—history.15
Self-Control and Class
The ideological ambiguity of the marshmallow test and the ways in which 
the test has become completely interwoven with popular discussions of race 
(however coded) and class may be illustrated with the example of an op-ed 
piece from 2006 (titled “Marshmallows and Public Policy”) by New York Times 
columnist David Brooks. Here Brooks observed how crucial it was for think 
tanks to learn the lessons of the marshmallow test—precisely because the test 
identified “core psychological traits like delayed gratification skills.” Not grasp-
ing the import of the marshmallow experiment (or so Brooks lamented) meant 
that policy experts were “just dancing around with proxy issues” while “not 
getting to the crux of the problem.” Acknowledging the damage done by pov-
erty (“children from poorer homes are more likely to have their lives disrupted 
by marital breakdown, violence, moving, etc.”), Brooks nonetheless derided the 
idea of “structural reforms” and “structural remedies,” noting that their results 
“are almost always disappointingly modest.” Instead, he emphasized that “for 
people without self-control skills, . . . life is a parade of foolish decisions: teen 
pregnancy, drugs, gambling, truancy and crime,” and thus that policymakers 
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should instead be asking “core questions, such as how do we get people to mas-
ter the sort of self-control that leads to success?”16
While such a conclusion may appear to be free of ideological bias, a review 
of historical perspectives reveals quite the opposite. For instance, and despite 
the ways in which Brooks presented his thesis about the failure to delay grati-
fication as self-evidently a road to disaster, this perspective was not in fact the 
slightest bit self-evident in prior decades. Instead, there was an active debate 
about the possible correlations between race, class, personality, and life suc-
cess, as well as a debate about the directions of causation.
African American social anthropologist and psychologist Allison Davis, 
professor of education at the University of Chicago and an early postwar schol-
ar of self-discipline, argued in 1948 against a view that class differences were 
the result of an inability to defer gratification. Davis was unconvinced of the 
general usefulness of gratification delay. More importantly, his research showed 
that socioeconomic status was not a consequence of personality traits. Davis’s 
findings had implications for education but also for thinking about the intersec-
tions of race and class.
For starters, Davis insisted on the need for scholars and policymakers to 
grasp that lower-class culture valued entirely different skills and competencies 
than middle-class culture did. Davis found “pathetic,” for instance, the effort 
to measure lower-class children by middle-class standards of docility and ver-
bal fluency.17 He called for an educational approach that encouraged children 
across all classes to be given opportunities for problem solving and that culti-
vated their abilities to reason, analyze, invent, and imagine. Davis reasoned that 
if lower-class individuals did not restrain various impulses, it was because they 
were poor; they were not poor because they were impulsive. Davis focused on 
how various “systems of control” served to organize Americans along strict 
class lines, and if there existed “certain gross differences” in behavior between 
groups, those differences had everything to do with class distinctions. Further-
more, Davis’s research empirically demonstrated that there were many more 
similarities between middle-class black and middle-class white families—and 
many more differences within the black community across class divisions. 
Therefore, Davis hypothesized that all and any differences between whites and 
blacks “are not related to hereditary, biological, or ‘racial’ factors.” Ultimately, 
Davis’s conclusion was not that the individuals needed to work on themselves 
but rather that the society needed to change. If educators truly wanted to wit-
ness improvements in “the personality development of Negro adolescents,” it 
would become necessary “to reorganize the social and economic structures” 
of the United States since only an economic restructuring could conceivably 
“decrease the social wastage of human lives in our society.”18
Notable, too, was that Davis was part of a much larger set of social sci-
entific conversations about the politics of self-control. He was hardly a lone 
voice. In one line of discussion, sociologists, psychologists, and educators in 
the 1930s and 1940s found that African Americans who sought to adapt to 
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white middle-class standards of self-renunciation were, due to racism, all too 
often denied the respect and benefits they had expected and hoped to receive. In 
1937, psychologist John Dollard wrote that “it can be assumed that human be-
ings never give up possibilities for gratification just for fun; self-restraint is dif-
ficult and there must be an adequate social premium on it. The general formula 
seems to be that the middle-class Negroes sacrifice the direct impulse gains of 
the lower-class group and expect to have in return the gratifications of prestige 
and mastery. They expect to get them, but the fact is that they are not always 
paid out according to our cultural model.” Like Allison Davis, Dollard too was 
convinced that efforts on the part of individuals to alter their personal behavior 
were not enough. “Lower-class culture cannot be changed in a more restrictive 
direction,” Dollard concluded, “until the social situation is changed and the 
economic and status rewards for labor and self-discipline are increased.”19
Another line of discussion had to do with class differences also among 
whites. Over and over, investigators established that patterns of child rearing—
including weaning, toilet training, restrictions on movement, and encourage-
ment to take on individual responsibilities—differed dramatically across class 
lines, with significant effects on the personality structures of the individuals 
raised in those two divergent worlds. A widely circulated article by psycholo-
gist Martha C. Ericson in 1946 (based on 100 interviews with middle-class 
and lower-class white mothers in Chicago) found that “middle-class children 
and lower-class children live in well-differentiated cultures” and that the differ-
ences showed up in the resulting personalities; middle-class children were like-
ly to be “subjected to more frustration in learning” and to be “more anxious” 
than their lower-class counterparts.20 When educator and psychologist Robert J. 
Havighurst gave a fuller report on Ericson’s findings and incorporated also her 
research on African American parents, “the results show that the same types of 
differences exist between middle and lower-class Negroes as between middle 
and lower-class whites.” Like Ericson, Havighurst took the view that the child-
rearing practices of middle-class parents caused children to experience “more 
frustrations of their impulses” than did the practices of working-class parents.21
The implicit suggestion that the restrictions on impulses might cause mal-
formations of character in middle-class children found fullest expression in 
1946 in Arnold W. Green’s “The Middle Class Male Child and Neurosis.” Bas-
ing his theories on growing up in a small Massachusetts community of Polish 
immigrant and native-born families, Green noted a relative absence of neu-
rotic symptoms among the working-class immigrant children in contrast to a 
concomitant prevalence of emotional problems exhibited by the economically 
better-situated native-born children. Green leveled his critique at the white mid-
dle-class family as a place where the father saw his son as sapping emotional 
energies and resources better conserved to advance his own status and mate-
rial progress. And mothers found themselves trapped in a domestic existence 
where every waking moment was devoted to “the drudgery of housecleaning, 
diapers, and the preparation of meals.” The marriage life (and the marriage bed) 
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languished as a consequence, as the wife watched how “half her working day 
is spent doing something she does not like, [while] the rest is spent thinking up 
ways of getting even with her husband.” The child caught in this nexus of pain 
and internalized self-denial soon discovered that “the living room furniture is 
more important to his mother than his impulse to crawl over it,” a fact that “un-
questionably finds a place in the background of the etiology of a certain type of 
neurosis, however absurd it may appear.”22
Sociologists through the 1950s and into the 1960s persisted in arguing 
that when middle-class parents enforced delayed gratification strategies, these 
produced neuroses in children. Sociologist Albert K. Cohen’s Delinquent Boys 
(1955), a pioneering study in subcultures—however counterintuitively, given 
its title—perpetuated the negative view associated with middle-class attitudes 
and mores. Cohen scarcely moderated his disdain for middle-class parents who 
placed an unhealthful premium on their children’s “readiness” and “ability to 
postpone and to subordinate the temptations of immediate satisfactions and 
self-indulgence in the interest of the achievement of long-run goals.” Cohen 
was overtly sarcastic when he discussed how middle-class parents acted as 
though “industry and thrift, even divorced from any conscious utilitarian objec-
tives, are admirable in themselves.” More often than not, the life of a middle-
class child, Cohen added, was “geared to a timetable, to the future as well as the 
present,” and as a consequence the child became “constantly aware of what his 
parents want him to be and to become.” None of these values, Cohen empha-
sized, had much to do with love. On the contrary, middle-class children were 
socialized early to recognize that any love their parents might express toward 
them was “precarious and contingent”: “something to be merited, to be earned 
by effort and achievement.”23
Sociologists who explored the styles and behaviors of “delinquent” youth 
in the 1950s and early 1960s also found the concept of an emotionally warped 
middle class to be enormously productive. For one thing, and as paradoxical as 
it may sound, this concept enabled sociologists to argue that there were ruptures 
and continuities between “straight” and “delinquent” worlds. No one wanted to 
play by the rules all the time. It was not only delinquents who had the itch to es-
cape the rat race. Everyone sought their “kicks,” and so a search for thrills could 
hardly be labeled “a deviant value, in any full sense,” but actually existed “side 
by side with the values of security, routinization, and the rest.” As a significant 
reflection from 1961 on the phenomenon of delinquency summarized, “In other 
words, the middle class citizen may seem like a far cry from the delinquent on 
the prowl for ‘thrills,’ but they both recognize and share the idea that ‘thrills’ 
are worth pursuing.”24
By the early 1960s, the sociologist and historian William Sewell—disagree-
ing strongly with the ascription of unhappy uptightness to the middle class and 
confirming the newer trend that found middle-class parents actually often to be 
the more permissive ones—argued that it was in fact difficult to find any clear 
correlation between personality and socioeconomic status. Sewell found fault 
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with Davis, Havighurst, and Ericson’s conclusions on the restrictiveness of mid-
dle-class mothers and the ensuing supposed greater frustration of middle-class 
children’s impulses. But his irritation was directed primarily at what he saw as 
the overenthusiastic reception of those particular conclusions by the many so-
cial science and social work experts who had also uncritically absorbed Green’s 
portrait of the neurotic male middle-class child desperate to please his parents. 
Sewell was articulately dismissive of how a narrowly Freudian fixation on the 
very early childhood years, especially on breast and bowels, had gone unchal-
lenged across the social sciences for more than fifteen years. He was most ada-
mant in emphasizing that extant recent studies “offered absolutely no support 
for the notion that middle-class children more commonly exhibit neurotic per-
sonality traits than do children of lower-class origins.”25 And he made a raft of 
suggestions for how large-scale research on the three-way relationship between 
socioeconomic status, child-rearing practices, and personality adjustment might 
be designed more carefully in the future. Missing from Sewell’s survey, however, 
was any attention to the original context in which Davis, Havighurst, and Ericson 
were writing and the urgent need they had felt to refute racist assumptions about 
African Americans and thus to disaggregate race from class.
Predicting Deviance
In the 1950s, research about self-control and character development had 
also begun to have a major impact in the interdisciplinary field of criminology. 
Arguably, no single text in this field loomed larger than Unraveling Juvenile 
Delinquency (1950), a major study conducted by Harvard criminologists Elea-
nor Glueck and Sheldon Glueck. The Gluecks began their research already in 
the late 1930s, at which time they then devoted a full ten years to a longitudinal 
analysis of 500 delinquent and nondelinquent boys. The Gluecks concluded 
that there were a multitude of factors—temperamental, intellectual, familial, 
and biological—that contributed to a boy’s potential for the development of 
delinquent behavior later in his life. They hypothesized that the boys who grew 
up in an environment that was “little controlled and culturally inconsistent” 
more readily tended to “give expression to their untamed impulses and their 
self-centered desires by means of various forms of delinquent behavior.” One 
almost invariably found in the future delinquent, the Gluecks noted, that “ten-
dencies towards uninhibited energy-expression” had been “deeply anchored” 
in the child’s “psyche and in the malformations of character during the first few 
years of life.”26 There were, or so the Gluecks surmised, remarkable continu-
ities between childhood deviance and adult criminality.
The Gluecks additionally designed a Social Prediction Table (SPT) to be 
used by social workers, psychologists, educators, and criminologists to fore-
cast a young child’s chances of growing from juvenile delinquency into adult 
criminality. In the course of the 1950s, a number of studies conducted around 
the United States (as well as Japan and France) tended to validate the usefulness 
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of the SPT.27 By 1960, and building directly on the Gluecks’ research, the New 
York Times reported how a longitudinal study of “likely bad boys” conducted 
in the Bronx had established that “the detection of potential delinquency in 
children under 6 years old has been reduced to a relatively exact science.”28 
Notable as well was the fascinating study, Deviant Children Grown Up (1966), 
which further confirmed the Gluecks’ analysis. Here sociologist Lee Robins 
had reviewed discarded records from a child guidance clinic in St. Louis from 
the 1920s and 1930s and then had tracked down and conducted follow-up in-
terviews with 100 individuals—now in their forties—who had received coun-
seling at the clinic thirty years earlier. What Robins concluded—as had the 
Gluecks in the 1950s—was that “adult antisocial behavior virtually requires 
childhood antisocial behavior.”29 Woven through this thread of research was a 
general conclusion that exposure to “low moral standards” in the homes where 
children grew up was an absolutely key factor in predicting future delinquent 
and criminal behaviors.30
Efforts to devise a successful predictive test for childhood deviancy and 
attempts to dissect the social psychological mechanisms of delay and reward 
were soon to find common cause. This interdisciplinary meeting of method-
ologies did not, however, happen all at once, perhaps because the history of 
delay and reward had long involved the use of animals (e.g., rats or pigeons) 
as trial subjects. The efforts to theorize a relationship between a delay in re-
inforcement and learning response had their origins in the first decades of the 
twentieth century.31 These experiments had either typically involved the use of 
delayed rewards to train animals to perform specific tasks or had involved an 
effort to predict how variable delays during the acquisition of a skill correlated 
with greater resistance to extinction of those skills.32 Once experimental studies 
turned to the use of children as subjects in the course of the 1950s, these early 
tests also investigated principally the causal impact of reinforcement delay on 
learning and skill acquisition.33 A predictive link between deviancy and rein-
forcement delay as an area of inquiry arrived somewhat later.
Making this connection between a child’s struggle to choose between 
delayed or immediate gratification and the development of a personality that 
could (or could not) control deviant behavior was an innovation that can be 
credited to Walter Mischel. The first delayed gratification experiment Mischel 
ever conducted involved field research with several dozen “Negro” and “In-
dian” children between the ages of seven and nine on the West Indies island of 
Trinidad. Strikingly, Mischel sought to challenge the crude generalizations that 
“the Negroes are impulsive, indulge themselves, settle for next to nothing if 
they can get it right away, do not work or wait for bigger things in the future but, 
instead, prefer smaller gains immediately,” while “the Indian is said to deprive 
himself and to be willing and able to postpone immediate gain and pleasure 
for the sake of obtaining greater rewards and returns in the future.” (Mischel 
presented these generalizations as each group’s own expressed prejudices about 
the other.) In his experiment, Mischel did find some correlation between ethnic 
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group and choice behavior (with more “Negro” than “Indian” children seek-
ing immediate gratification). But he also found evidence that “the presence or 
absence of the father” in the home mattered just as much—regardless of the 
child’s racial background. And he likewise found that older children were bet-
ter able to delay—again, regardless of race. This suggested that an ability to 
resist immediate temptation represented “a learned behavior which is, in part, a 
function of the expectancy that the promised reinforcement will issue from the 
social agent in spite of time delay.”34 In short, at this point Mischel’s analysis 
included attention to the question of how reliably the child could count on the 
testing adult to come through with that larger piece of candy.
Mischel’s subsequent decision to moralize about the meanings of delayed 
gratification became evident little by little over a period of some years. It was 
a decision linked to Mischel’s interest in extant psychological research on mal-
adaptive social behaviors on the one hand and his concern with correlations be-
tween social learning and maturity on the other.35 The more emotionally health-
ful a child was, Mischel began to hypothesize, the more capably that child could 
delay gratification; this was due to the fact that he or she possessed an ability to 
think through the consequences of a present action in the future. “A person does 
not have to perform particular behaviors himself to learn their consequences,” 
Mischel would explain in 1968, choosing an unusual but certainly evocative ex-
ample to clinch his argument: “For example, a man does not have to be arrested 
for wearing dresses in public to learn some of the consequences of transvestism. 
Any information that alters the person’s anticipations about the probable out-
comes to which a behavior will lead should also change the likelihood that he 
will engage in the behavior.”36 Whether and how children developed behaviors 
that were (conventionally conceived as) deviant behaviors began to move from 
the margins to the center of social psychological thinking about a capacity for 
delayed gratification in children.
Already in 1964, Mischel made explicit his hypothesis that there was a cor-
relation between social deviance and incapacity to delay gratification. Mischel 
began to position his research into gratification delay as being in direct lineage 
with studies that had “investigated resistance to temptation, and tried to corre-
late the subject’s reactions when under pressure to violate his standards with in-
dices of ‘guilt’ and with aspects of parental disciplinary techniques.”37 In one of 
the few experiments Mischel conducted that utilized the strategy of deception 
of test subjects, teenagers kept their own scores while they played an arcade-
style game, but the points they were able to earn were rigged so that “the scores 
they got made it impossible to win a badge: to get a badge, they had to cheat 
by falsifying their scores, and to win a better badge they had to fake it even 
more.”38 Although this test had concerned frustrating circumstances in which 
actual skill was never appropriately rewarded rather than a test for deferring 
a gratification that could be trusted eventually to arrive, Mischel extrapolated 
more broadly: “If the subject is to resist the temptation and to refrain from devi-
ant behavior, he must be able to defer immediate gratification.”39 A new social 
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psychological paradigm that emphasized the responsible need for self-control 
was born.
Self-Control and Public Policy
The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, written by political sci-
entist (and assistant secretary of labor) Daniel Patrick Moynihan and published 
by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Policy Planning and Research 
in 1965, likely still remains best remembered—and reviled—for making an 
argument that the African American community suffered from a “tangle of pa-
thology.” Chief among these pathologies, or so Moynihan held, was that the 
black family “has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it 
is so out of line with the rest of the American society, seriously retards the 
progress of the group as a whole.”40 Intended to call attention to the long-term 
damages caused by white racism, the Moynihan Report achieved an opposite 
effect, quickly becoming “the focal point for one of the more vociferous public 
debates about policy in the history of the nation,” while Moynihan himself “was 
pilloried as a racist and the foremost neoconservative on matters of race.”41 The 
backlash against the Moynihan Report was sustained and intensely hostile.42 
As historian Ellen Herman astutely observed, civil rights activists and their 
supporters assailed Moynihan for implying that the problems that afflicted the 
African American family “were primarily personal and psychological” rather 
than acknowledging how “racial oppression produced social pathology rather 
than vice versa.” Thus, or so his critics asserted, what Moynihan suggested was 
that “institutional racism and discrimination could be deemphasized or even 
eliminated as a terrain of governmental action.”43 The Moynihan Report repre-
sented, psychologist and political activist William Ryan famously declared in 
1971, a classic case of “blaming the victim.”44 This characterization has largely 
stuck to the Moynihan Report over the past half century.45
At the same time, the Moynihan Report brought little that was new to light 
in its explanations for the root causes of African American poverty. Rather, 
what the Moynihan Report did was cull analyses from several well-regarded 
expert texts in the behavioral and social sciences. For instance, and notably, 
its discussions of black family life made repeated references to A Profile of 
the Negro American (1964) by social psychologist Thomas Pettigrew.46 And 
social psychological research informed the report in at least one additional and 
important respect.
This had to do with the psychological roots of juvenile crime and delin-
quency. Citing several of Mischel’s early experiments, the Moynihan Report 
accepted as simple fact that an individual’s ability to defer gratification cor-
related with that individual’s family structure. Children in “fatherless homes” 
sought out “immediate gratification of their desires,” and those youth (in their 
“hunger for immediate gratification”) were, in turn, “more prone to delinquen-
cy, along with other less social behavior.” Turning back to the work of Petti-
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grew, the report added that boys from “high delinquency neighborhoods” raised 
in “stable, intact families” were able to resist—and rise above—the misfortune 
of their surroundings.47 Although it has been largely unacknowledged in the 
voluminous scholarship on the Moynihan Report, the report thus promoted a 
hypothesis that gratification delay enabled persons to advance socioeconomi-
cally—while self-indulgence condemned persons to a life replete with personal 
problems and squandered opportunities.48
A concept that an inability to delay gratification might be linked to African 
American poverty persisted in the public policy literature of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. In 1968, the Manpower Report of the President addressed a con-
cern that “social-psychological factors,” which included “attitudes, aspirations, 
motivation (especially achievement motivation)” as well as an “ability or will-
ingness to defer gratification,” represented “barriers to employment” and thus 
provided “explanations of the job behavior of low-income Negroes and others 
who have difficulty in getting and keeping jobs.”49 Political scientist Edward 
Banfield’s The Unheavenly City (1968) was saturated with (racially coded) as-
sumptions about the inability of poor people to delay gratification. For instance, 
Banfield observed how “the lower-class individual lives from moment to mo-
ment. . . . He is therefore radically improvident: whatever he cannot consume 
immediately he considers valueless. His bodily needs (especially for sex) and 
his taste for ‘action’ take precedence over everything else—and certainly over 
any work routine.”50 Such were the terms of debate by 1972 that Amitai Etzioni, 
director of the Center for Policy Research at Columbia University and writing 
in the Saturday Review, could suggest (in language that could also be read as 
racially-coded) that federally sponsored training programs that sought “to try to 
change” the “work behavior” of “disadvantaged” individuals were destined to 
fail because “human beings are not very easy to change after all” and that train-
ing programs would fare far better if they helped such persons “choose jobs 
compatible with their personalities”51 [Figure 2]. A circular argument emerged; 
people who lacked an ability to resist immediate satisfactions were more likely 
to fail in socioeconomic terms, while lower-class persons suffered from an in-
ability to defer gratification. It was, as historian Alice O’Connor has noted, a 
“profile of lower-class personality disorders” that was “contradictory, cultur-
ally biased, and remarkably simplistic at times” and that yet continued to gain 
ground—at least among illiberal social policy researchers.52
Many social scientists were unconvinced. A widely cited article already in 
1965 argued, for instance, that the so-called poverty and self-indulgence para-
digm that used a “deferred gratification pattern” (DGP) to explicate “‘lower 
class behavior’” was just “a thin reed on which to hang analyses of behavior” 
and that therefore DGP cannot be “mechanically applied to interpret low in-
come life.” The critique discussed previously unpublished social psychological 
research that tested the DGP; an experimenter promised candy to two randomly 
assigned groups of children from various racial and social backgrounds, but he 
then broke his promise to one of the two groups. When he repeated the experi-
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ment, it was not class or race that determined a child’s ability or inability to de-
fer gratification but rather whether the child belonged to the group that had been 
deceived. “The situational variable, then, rather than class affiliation deter-
mined the ability to delay,” this research found. The article concluded that “at 
the level of social science analysis, the verdict on the DGP is ‘not proven.’”53 
And yet a commonsense view that jumbled causation (while being drenched in 
associations with both class status and racial identity)—and assumed that a per-
son’s inability to control his or her immediate impulses predicted that person’s 
ability to succeed in life—simply refused to die.
Self-Control and IQ
By 1974, Mischel started to make more pronounced arguments about cau-
sation and not just correlation between class status and a demonstrated capacity 
for impulse control. He noted that the “middle and upper (in contrast to lower) 
socioeconomic classes” exhibited “higher intelligence, more mature cognitive 
development, and a greater capacity for sustained attention” and how “mem-
bership in the lower socioeconomic classes” correlated with lower levels of 
these same qualities. But he also began to itemize “the magnitude of the social 
Figure 2: Excerpt from Amitai Etzioni’s “Human Beings Are Not Very Easy 
to Change After All,” Saturday Review 55 (June 3, 1972): 45. Image used by 
permission of UNZ.org, 2016, and Amitai Etzioni. 
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problems” associated with “inadequate voluntary delay and deficiencies in self-
control.” Despite his qualifying use of the word “partial,” Mischel contended 
that “inadequate delay patterns” often were “the partial causes of antisocial and 
criminal behavior, violence and physical aggression, and failure to achieve rea-
sonable work and interpersonal satisfactions.” In sum, Mischel made what was 
at that point the most far-reaching case to date that “deficiencies in voluntary 
delay may become a major source of frustration by guaranteeing the individual 
an endless chain of failure in our culture.” Indeed, Mischel here effectively did 
not shy from making the most grandiose claims for his marshmallow-derived 
findings, as now the fate of society itself was said to be at stake: “Basic to most 
philosophical concepts of ‘will power’ and the parallel psychological construct 
of ‘ego strength’ is the ability to postpone immediate gratification for the sake 
of future consequences, to impose delays of reward on oneself, and to toler-
ate such self-initiated frustration. It is difficult to conceive of socialization (or, 
indeed, of civilization) without such self-imposed delays.”54 Although surely 
unintended by Mischel, these maneuvers opened up his research to a whole new 
range of ideological applications.
It was psychologist Richard J. Herrnstein who first imported a version of 
Mischel’s concepts about self-imposed delays, socioeconomic class status, and 
“deviant” behavior into the discipline of criminology. In the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, Herrnstein had published animal research (with pigeons) on the 
use of variable-interval time-delayed reinforcements.55 He had clearly followed 
the progress of Mischel’s research. This would be confirmed in 1985 when, 
in Crime and Human Nature, a tome Herrnstein cowrote with political scien-
tist James Q. Wilson, the authors not only offered favorable assessments of 
the longitudinal studies of Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck as well as sociologist 
Lee Robins but also and additionally made honorable mention of Mischel’s 
social psychological research on delayed gratification. With an explicit refer-
ence to Mischel, the authors noted how “offenders are much more likely than 
nonoffenders to prefer an immediate small reward to a delayed larger one.” 
And citing the same 1974 passage from Mischel quoted above, Herrnstein and 
Wilson portentously concluded how the “predisposition to impulsiveness” in 
children, “when combined with a family setting in which rewards and penalties 
are not systematically made contingent on behavior,” in turn “leads to inad-
equate socialization” and places “a strain on civilization.”56 Mischel’s impact 
on the text’s analysis of what kind of person commits criminal acts was unmis-
takable—if also selectively skewed. The idea that familial breakdown led to 
deficiencies in self-control that, in turn, produced criminal behavior was not the 
viewpoint Mischel meant to promote, but his ideas proved very usable for an 
unabashedly right-wing causational theory.
There were equally tendentious efforts to cement connections between the 
(in)ability to delay gratification and a host of behavioral and cognitive issues. 
Mischel himself had initially proposed in 1962 that high delayers were on the 
whole more intelligent than poor delayers.57 But it was only in the course of the 
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1980s that a full-blown “cognitive deficit” theory linking low IQ and weak im-
pulse control to criminal behavior came to popular and scholarly fruition. Strik-
ingly, here again the pronouncements of pigeon psychologist Herrnstein proved 
instrumental.58 But the grand leap from an inability to resist temptation to low 
IQ and a propensity to commit crimes made its boldest entrance only in 1990. 
“Criminal acts provide immediate gratification of desires,” Michael R. Gottfred-
son and Travis Hirschi wrote that year in their milestone book, A General Theory 
of Crime, adding, “The cognitive requirements for most crimes are minimal.” For 
Gottfredson and Hirschi, poor impulse control explained “all crime, at all times, 
and, for that matter, many forms of behavior that are not sanctioned by the state.” 
For these authors, low self-control was “for all intents and purposes, the individ-
ual-level cause of crime,” and furthermore “the search for personality correlates 
of crime other than self-control” was “unlikely to bear fruit.”59 That blanket state-
ments like these elicited strong reaction would be an understatement; A General 
Theory of Crime would be the most widely discussed (and critiqued) text in the 
field of criminology published in the past quarter century.60
If poor people possessed low impulse control and lower IQs and were more 
prone to criminal behavior, what might be asserted about the well-to-do? Was 
there no criminal malfeasance at the higher echelons? Herrnstein had argued 
at least since 1971 that US society was developing into a meritocracy with 
high IQ scorers dominating the upper class (and low IQ scorers slipping into 
the socioeconomic bottom rung).61 However, a position that the wealthy de-
served their cozy status because they possessed the smartest genes truly came 
to prominence only with the publication of The Bell Curve. Here Herrnstein 
and political scientist Charles Murray popularized the concept of “cognitive 
stratification,” arguing that IQ scores essentially determined individuals’ eco-
nomic fortunes in life. Why would a “cognitive elite” not float “toward the 
upper income brackets,” Herrnstein and Murray pondered, as well as come to 
dominate “most of the institutions in society” while also acquiring “some of the 
characteristics of a caste”?62 Nor would Murray (after Herrnstein’s death the 
same month in 1994 when The Bell Curve was published) ever be prompted 
to revise himself. On the contrary, Murray was back at it in 2012, observing 
how “cognitive segregation” was “bound to start developing” in the United 
States “as soon as unusually smart people began to have the opportunity to hang 
out with other unusually smart people.” Brainy (and successful) parents quite 
simply produced brainy (and successful) children. This was so, Murray rhetori-
cally declared, because brainy parents possessed both excellent foresight and 
self-discipline. “The children of the new upper class are the object of intense 
planning from the moment the woman learns she is pregnant,” Murray noted. 
“She makes sure her nutritional intake exactly mirrors the optimal diet and 
takes classes (along with her husband) to prepare for a natural childbirth—a 
C-section is a last resort.” Also after the birth, an upper-class mother behaved 
perfectly: “She breast-feeds her new-born, usually to the complete exclusion of 
formula, and tracks the infant’s growth with the appropriate length and weight 
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charts continually. The infant is bombarded with intellectual stimulation from 
the moment of birth. . . . The mobile over the infant’s crib and the toys with 
which he is provided are designed to induce every possible bit of neural growth 
within the child’s cerebral cortex.”63
The well-to-do were experts at “intense planning” because they were bright, 
and well-to-do children were bright because their parents had been expert plan-
ners. And both talents taken together ensured the perpetuation of (what David 
Brooks in 2011 blithely labeled) “a hereditary meritocratic class” that success-
fully “passed down habits, knowledge, and cognitive traits” and thus success-
fully “reinforces itself through genes and strenuous cultivation generation after 
generation.”64 Small wonder that disability studies scholar Michael Bérubé had 
already in the 1990s characterized Murray’s vision of a world in which “unusu-
ally smart” parenting inevitably resulted in “unusually smart” children as noth-
ing other than a glossy and updated version of social Darwinism.65 And yet as 
problematic as Murray’s familial fantasies were, they nonetheless continued to 
accrue ideological weight and intellectual gravitas.66
If high IQ and high self-control often correlated, which was more signifi-
cant? Was IQ the most important measure of future success, or was it charac-
ter? On this point, not all education theorists were in agreement. In 1996, for 
instance, education professor Louis Goldman argued that “the development of 
character” was seldom achievable in a society “that legitimates the satisfaction 
of most appetites.” Goldman relied on both Allison Davis and Walter Mischel 
but in iconoclastic ways. When Goldman asserted that “social class differences 
appeared to be largely a function of the ability to defer gratification,” he went on 
directly to quote Davis from 1948 as evidence for the long-standing obviousness 
of his own point: “‘In slum groups, both children and adults are permitted far 
more gratification of their sexual responses and of their rage responses. This . . . 
extends into most of the basic areas of adolescent behavior in the lower classes.’” 
(Davis, in fact, had argued for the reverse causation.) But then, and specifically 
citing Mischel, Goldman also summarized that “recent studies have described 
subjects with high ability to delay gratification as interested in intellectual mat-
ters, scoring better on intelligence tests, being academically competent, verbally 
fluent, rational, attentive, and better able to plan.” What this meant, Goldman 
concluded, was how essential it was “to connect the lower social classes to the 
middle classes who may provide role models for self-discipline.”67 Nonetheless, 
Goldman still assumed that intelligence test scores mattered.
Self-Control and Education Reform
There must have been extraordinary hunger for an alternative framework. 
Against the position of right-leaning social scientists that human nature was 
essentially intractable (and therefore that the liberal policy programs associated 
with the 1960s and early 1970s were doomed to failure), a new theory began 
to be formulated at the turn of the millennium: a theory of human nature that 
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people could change—though by themselves and therefore without the crutch 
of a government-sponsored social welfare system. The notion of tractability—
which had been associated with the “social engineering” of liberal policy pro-
grams in the 1960s—had now itself shifted into a kinder, gentler, more politi-
cally muted (and less social and structurally oriented) psychological analysis. 
Theorists of self-control who counted themselves opposed to the right-wing 
perspective that personality was set in stone from birth (and was therefore ge-
netic or in some other way biological) tended to operate on the premise that 
they had never met a self-regulating behavior they did not like.
Gone were the post–New Deal era theories that too much delay of gratifica-
tion warped middle-class children, as adults and children alike were now being 
encouraged to master their impulses. But gone too was the 1990s conviction 
that IQ trumped all else. Instead, there were the new and immensely influen-
tial ideas of developmental psychologist Angela Duckworth. Duckworth had 
worked repeatedly with Mischel and turned what she learned about gratification 
delay into self-control exercises to help schoolchildren improve their academic 
performance. She also developed a so-called Grit scale to measure perseverance 
and motivation. Duckworth’s philosophy was as simple as had been Mischel’s 
initial marshmallow experiments. “There may be no such thing as ‘too much’ 
self-control,” she said in 2011.68 But were race and class really gone?
An education reform movement took off that posited the value of culti-
vating the impulse control of children of all colors and socioeconomic back-
grounds. Paul Tough’s best-selling How Children Succeed: Grit, Curiosity, and 
the Hidden Power of Character (2012) became the movement’s manifesto, 
as it also carefully linked psychological theories about self-control to a novel 
“cognitive hypothesis” buttressed by neuroscience that “what matters most in a 
child’s development” is “not how much information we can stuff into her brain” 
but rather that “we are able to help her develop a very different set of qualities, a 
list that includes persistence, self-control, curiosity, conscientiousness, grit, and 
self-confidence.”69 Tough relied extensively on Duckworth’s research when he 
offered these conclusions.
Despite recurrent invocations of Mischel as a key authority, though, these 
new perspectives concerning the virtues of self-discipline did not have their 
origins solely in Mischel’s work on delayed gratification. Another strand of 
thinking from the burgeoning field known as positive psychology blended into 
the work of the newest educational reformers. As psychologist Martin E. P. 
Seligman wrote in Learned Optimism (1991), a foundational text of the positive 
psychology movement, his view represented a rejection of the classic behav-
ioral experiment involving reinforcements and rats.70 Give a rat a pellet every 
time he pressed a bar, and he will learn to press the bar to receive a pellet. Never 
give a rat a pellet every time he pressed a bar, and he will stop pressing the bar 
to receive a pellet. Give a rat a pellet only once in a while when he presses a 
bar, and he will continue to press the bar for a long while before complete “ex-
tinction” of this impulse takes over—and he quits pressing the bar. Seligman 
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argued that this experiment with rats did not work with humans. Seligman con-
cluded instead that human behavior was controlled “not just by the ‘schedule of 
reinforcement’ in the environment but by an internal mental state, the explana-
tions people make for why the environment has scheduled their reinforcements 
in this way.” In terms of people’s persistence, then, “what really mattered” was 
“the way people think about the causes of successes and failures,” not so much 
whether they actually succeeded or failed.71 Rather than developing cognitive 
skills (like IQ), positive psychology directed attention toward “building and 
using your signature strengths” because “the good life is using your signature 
strengths every day to produce authentic happiness and abundant gratification,” 
as Seligman wrote in Authentic Happiness: Using the New Positive Psychology 
to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment (2002).72
As for the single most important predictor of personal achievement, Selig-
man and Duckworth together wrote in 2005 (based on a longitudinal study 
of more than 100 eighth graders) that it had virtually everything to do with 
“self-discipline”: “We found that self-discipline predicted academic perfor-
mance more robustly than did IQ. Self-discipline also predicted which students 
would improve their grades over the course of the school year, whereas IQ did 
not.”73 In 2013, Duckworth was awarded the prestigious MacArthur Foundation 
grant for her research on the critical role that self-control played in educational 
achievement. Tough’s and Duckworth’s non-IQ approach impressively avoided 
the elitism (and, given the mutual imbrication of the class and racial stratifica-
tions in US society, the not-so-hidden racism) of Murray and Herrnstein. But 
that did not mean that there were not class- and race-based assumptions about 
the direction of causation between individual character development and life 
success built into the studies on which they grounded their theories.
Conclusion
The history of IQ is a history of social ideology, historian Paula Fass re-
minds us, even as she also observes that the IQ test initially served progressive 
ends. IQ, as it was developed in the first three decades of the twentieth century, 
introduced a metric for “what seemed to be the fairest and the most practi-
cal as well as the most culturally felicitous, organizing principle” to measure 
an individual’s talent in an era of social upheaval and rapid cultural change.74 
My essay has argued that the history of EI is also a history of social ideology 
and that self-control—“the master aptitude” that Goleman most associated with 
EI—has been an ambiguous concept intended to resolve dilemmas raised by 
the racialized assumptions that had by the 1990s come quite dramatically to 
taint the reputation of IQ testing.75 While IQ was said to be innate, EI was 
argued to be the opposite; EI could be acquired, its proponents argued, and it 
could be taught. And self-control was the principal marker of having achieved 
greater EI. In an article on EI in 1995, Time magazine made the connections 
clear. It not only opened its cover story on EI with a laudatory summary of the 
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marshmallow test. (“It seems that the ability to delay gratification is a master 
skill, a triumph of the reasoning brain over the impulsive one.”) It also went on 
uncritically to applaud the development of “emotional literacy” programs that 
were “designed to help children learn to manage anger, frustration, loneliness” 
as educators sought actively to reevaluate “the weight they have been giving 
to traditional lessons and standardized tests.”76 EI (in the first decades of the 
twenty-first century) like IQ (in the first decades of the twentieth century) is 
a concept used to evaluate individuals in a fashion that (its advocates argue) 
is equitable and unbiased. That IQ was perceived to be a flawed metric only 
caused another metric to be invented. But when EI arrived on the scene, it did 
so with its own complicated and historically heavy ideological baggage, one 
ineluctably linked to the shifting meanings associated with self-control. This is 
the history that this essay has reconstructed.
The very concept of self-control had once been a profoundly racialized 
one. The way that coded, now-you-see-it-now-you-don’t references to race have 
moved in and out of focus in the literature on self-control reveals much about 
the ideological work done by any social psychological theory that directs atten-
tion away from broader contexts and toward the individual’s success or failure 
at self-management. But the concept of self-control was all along also very 
much a class-tied concept. Just as direct references to race largely disappeared 
by the 1990s, so too a second great erasure would by the early twenty-first cen-
tury remove explicit acknowledgment of socioeconomic status from the bur-
geoning literature on self-improvement. The seemingly universal address of the 
current injunctions to all individuals to upgrade their self-control skills masks 
how these ubiquitously repeated injunctions direct attention away from the 
open secret of (ever more rapidly widening) class divisions—and the descent 
of a (formerly more secure) middle class into greater and greater insecurity. In 
short, the history of gratification delay and EI is an important aspect of the his-
tory of race and of class in postwar America, even though many advocates of 
self-control still labor to camouflage that this is so.
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